Goal Problems in Gambling Theory*

Theodore P. Hill
Center for Applied Probability and
School of Mathematics
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA 30332-0160

Abstract
A short introduction to goal problems in abstract gambling theory is given,
along with statements of some of the main theorems and a number of examples, open
problems and references. Emphasis is on the ﬁnite-state, countably-additive setting
with such classical objectives as reaching a goal, hitting a goal inﬁnitely often, staying
in the goal, and maximizing the average time spent at a goal.
1. Introduction
In the classical gamblers’ ruin problem (cf. Feller [F]) a gambler beginning with x0
dollars bets $1 at each play, winning a dollar with probability p and losing a dollar
with probability q = 1 − p, until he either goes broke (hits 0) or else reaches a given
goal such as $1000. The successive wins/losses are independent, and he has no control
over the game or decisions to inﬂuence his likelihood of winning.
In many real-life gambling situations, however, the gambler is not forced to
make the same wager at each step, but rather he is free to select from a variety of
strategies. For example, in red-and-black (cf. [DSa]) the gambler may at each step
bet any amount b less than or equal to his current fortune x and he then wins b dollars
with probability p and loses b dollars with probability q (i.e., he moves to x + b with
probability p and to x − b with probability q).
It is this freedom of selection of strategies which is the essence of abstract mathe
matical gambling theory, and the purpose of this article is to give a brief introduction
* Partially supported by U.S. National Science Foundation Grant DMS-95-03375.
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to this rich and deep sub-ﬁeld of discrete-time stochastic control, with emphasis on
ﬁnite-state (hence countably-additive) gambling problems with ﬁxed goals. As such,
the ideas reviewed here are a small part of the general abstract theory of gambling
which includes general state spaces (including questions of measurable and general
non-measurable selection strategies) and general payoﬀ or utility functions. Dubins
and Savage’s classic treatise [DSa] is the basis for many of the ideas presented here;
for a more extensive introduction to the subject, and its application to the ﬁeld of
stochastic games, the reader is referred to Maitra and Sudderth’s ([MS1], [MS2]) re
cent articles. Abstract gambling theory, in turn, is part of the mathematical theory of
stochastic processes, and is closely related to Blackwell’s (e.g., [Bl]) theory of dynamic
programming.
2. Gambling Problems and Strategies
The purpose of this section is to give a formal mathematical description of gambling
problems and strategies; notation will generally follow that in [MS1].
A gambling problem is a triple (S, Γ, u) where: S is the state space (in this
exposition always a nonempty ﬁnite set), which represents the gambler’s possible
fortunes; Γ is a function from S to nonempty sets of probability measures deﬁned on
(the sigma algebra of all subsets of) S, where Γ(x) represents the bets or gambles
available to the player when his fortune is x � S; and u is a bounded function (called
the payoﬀ function) from S IN to the real numbers which the gambler is trying to
maximize.
Example 2.1. (Red-and-black) S = {0, 1, . . . , 2g − 2}, Γ(x) = {�(x)} for x � g, and
for x < g, Γ(x) = {p�(x + j) + q�(x − j) : j = 0, 1, . . . , x}, where �(a) is the dirac
delta measure with mass 1 on the singleton {a}. The goal here is to reach at least g,
so u is the function u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = 1 if xj � g for some j, and = 0 otherwise. Note
that Γ(0) = {�(0)} (so 0 and all states x � g are absorbing states) and that for this
classical formulation of red-and-black, a sequence of fortunes which never reaches g
is worthless, no matter how close to g it comes.
A strategy available to the gambler who has initial fortune x0 is a selection rule δ
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which associates to each ﬁnite sequence of fortunes x0 , x1 , x2 , . . . , xn a single gamble
δ(x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) � Γ(xn ). Thus an initial gamble δ(x0 ) � Γ(x0 ) is selected, and
then for every subsequent stage of play, one single gamble is identiﬁed from the set
of gambles available at the current fortune. In general, strategies may be heavily
dependent on the past histories of fortunes, but two important natural and compar
atively simple classes of strategies are those of stationary strategies, which depend
only on the current fortune, and Markov strategies, which depend on the current
fortune and time. Thus a stationary strategy satisﬁes δ(x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) = γ(xn ) for
all x0 , . . . , xn � S, where for each x � S, γ(x) � Γ(x) is a ﬁxed gamble which
will be used whenever the current fortune is x; each such strategy corresponds to a
single Markov chain on S with stationary transition probabilities (selected to be in
Γ). Similarly, a Markov strategy corresponds to a Markov chain on S whose transi
tion probabilities at time n are independent of past successions of states, formally,
δ(x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) = δ(x0 , x�1 , x�2 , . . . , x�n ) whenever xn = x�n . (Note that by deﬁnition
all stationary strategies are Markov.)

Example 2.2. (Timid play in red-and-black).

Deﬁne the strategy δt by

δt (x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) = p�(xn + 1) + q�(xn − 1) for all 0 < x < g. This is the station
ary strategy which selects the smallest possible nonzero bet at each (non-absorbing)
state.

Example 2.3. (Bold play in red-and-black). Deﬁne the stationary strategy δb by
δb (x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) = p�(xn + k) + q�(xn − k) where for xn < g, k = min{xn , g − xn }
is the largest available bet which will not overshoot the goal. So in particular if
g = 1000, δb prescribes a bet of exactly of 3 dollars if the current fortune is either 3
or 997, etc.

Example 2.4. (A nonstationary Markov strategy in red-and-black). Deﬁne δM by
δM (x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) = δb (x0 , . . . , xn ) if n < 10, and = δt (x0 , . . . , xn ) if n � 10. This
simple Markov strategy switches from bold play to timid play at time 10.
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Example 2.5. (A non-Markov strategy in red-and-black).

Deﬁne δN by

δN (x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) = δb (x0 , x1 , . . . , xn ) if x1 < 3, and = �(xn ) otherwise. This some
what irrational strategy uses bold play at time n if the fortune at time 1 was < 3,
and otherwise stagnates forever.
Each strategy δ induces a countably-additive probability measure P� on the
Borel subsets of S IN in a natural way as follows. First, P� (x1 × S IN ) = δ(x0 )({x1 }),
i.e., the probability that the sequence starts with x1 is the measure of x1 under
the initial gamble chosen, δ(x0 ) � Γ(x0 ). Next P� ((x1 , x2 ) × S IN ) = δ(x0 )({x1 }) ·
δ(x0 , x1 )({x2 }), etc. In other words, if X1 , X2 , . . . , represent the fortunes at times
1, 2, . . ., then X1 has distribution δ(x0 ), and the conditional distribution of X2 given
X1 = x1 is δ(x0 , x1 ), etc. Thus a given strategy δ determines the complete joint dis
tribution P� of the stochastic process X1 , X2 , . . . of states via the standard extension
from the measures of those cylinder sets.
For example, in bold play δb for red-and-black (with g = 100, say, and x0 = 10),
P�b (X1 = 10) = 0, P�b (X1 = 20, X2 = 40) = p2 , P�b (X1 = 20, X2 = 0) = pq, etc.
3. The Optimal Return Function and the Value of a Strategy
Recall that the payoﬀ function u is a bounded real-valued function on S IN , the set
of all inﬁnite sequences of states (often called histories), and that each strategy δ
determines a unique probability measure on the Borel subsets of S IN .
The value of strategy δ is simply the expected payoﬀ V (δ) with respect to the
probability distribution P� deﬁned by δ, that is
�
V (δ) =
u dP�
S IN

Example 3.1. In red-and-black, where the objective is simply to reach the goal g
(i.e., u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = 1 if xi � g for some i, and = 0 otherwise), the value V (δ) of the
strategy δ is simply
V (δ) = P� (Xi � g for some i � 1),
and since the timid-play strategy δt,x starting at x corresponds to the classical gam
bler’s ruin problem, its value is simply the probability that a simple random walk
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which starts from x and moves to the right with probability p will reach g before
reaching 0, and the classical solution (cf. [DSa, p. 170]) is
� �x
� �g−x
1 − pq
p
� �g
V (δt,x ) =
q
1 − pq
Example 3.2. The corresponding value for bold play in red-and-black starting at
x, δb,x , is more complicated, but for small state spaces may be calculated easily as
follows in the case g = 3. V (δb,0 ) = 0 and V (δb,g ) = 1 by deﬁnition, and V (δb,1 )
and V (δb,2 ) satisfy V (δb,1 ) = qV (δb,0 ) + pV (δb,2 ), V (δb,2 ) = qV (δb,1 ) + pV (δb,g ),
which implies V (δb,1 ) = p2 /(1 − qp) and V (δb,2 ) = p/(1 − qp). (Note that for g = 3,
δt = δb .)
The optimal payoﬀ function V is the real-valued function on S which is the
optimal expected payoﬀ over all possible strategies starting at x
V (x) = sup{V (δ) : δ is a strategy starting at x}.
That is, V (x) represents the best a gambler can do starting at x.
An optimal strategy starting at x is a strategy at x satisfying
V (δ) = V (x).
In general, the values of general strategies and optimal payoﬀ functions are diﬃ
cult to obtain explicitly, and a major contribution of [DSa] is a general theory which
characterizes optimal payoﬀ functions.
For red-and-black, however, it is known that for favorable games (i.e., p > 1/2)
timid play is optimal [Br], and for unfavorable games (p ⊂ 1/2) bold play is optimal
[DSa, Theorem 5.3.1]. This corresponds to the intuitively plausible idea that for
favorable games, the random walk will tend to drift to the right, so taking steps as
small as possible will make this drift look almost deterministic, making the probability
of reaching the goal high. For unfavorable games however, the drift is to the left, and
small bets will be a poor strategy for exactly the same reason; playing just the
opposite by maximizing bets (bold play) is much better.
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4. Goal Problems
In a goal problem there is a ﬁxed set of goal states G � S, and the payoﬀ function u
reﬂects various objectives associated with G such as reaching G at least once, hitting
G inﬁnitely often, staying in G forever, or maximizing the average time spent in G.
This section will survey some of the basic theorems about goal problems and give
examples to illustrate them.
Reaching a Goal. If S is ﬁnite and Γ(x) is ﬁnite for each x � S (that is, each state
has only a ﬁnite number of gambles available at it), then there is always a stationary
optimal strategy [DSa, Theorem 3.9.1] for the payoﬀ
u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = 1 if xi � G for some i � 1, and = 0 otherwise.
In red-and-black, bold play δb is one such optimal stationary strategy if p ⊂ 1/2, and
timid play δt if p > 1/2. If Γ(x) is inﬁnite for some x, there may exist no optimal
strategies.
Example 4.1. S = {0, 1, g}, Γ(0) = {�(0)}, Γ(1) = Γ(g) = {p�(g) + (1 − p)�(0) : p <
1}. Then V (0) = 0, V (1) = 1, but V (δs ) < 1 for any stationary strategy δs starting
at state 1.

As is seen in the above example, however, there do exist arbitrarily good sta
tionary strategies (i.e., for each � > 0 there is a stationary strategy δs� with V (δs� ) �
1 − �). This is always the case for ﬁnite-state goal problems with objective reaching
the goal, which is a special case of [DSa, Theorem 3.9.2], and which was extended in
[O, Theorem B] to countable S, and in [Su, Theorem 2.3] to a much larger class of
problems including many with uncountable S and ﬁnitely additive transition proba
bilities. Generalizing in other directions, for countable S there is always a stationary
strategy which both (nearly) maximizes the probability of reaching the goal and
(nearly) minimizes the expected time to the goal [DH1, Theorem 4.2]. For ﬁnite S
there is always a Markov strategy which is monotonically improving and optimal is
the limit along every history [HvW, Theorem 5.15], but such a strategy may not
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always be constructed by simply switching to a “better” gamble at each successive
return to a state; in some cases it is necessary to use certain gambles for arbitrary
long time periods, then switch to a diﬀerent gamble for an even larger time, and so
on, as can be seen Example 4.2 below.
Hitting a Goal Inﬁnitely Often. In some goal problems, the objective is not just
to reach the goal once, but to hit the goal inﬁnitely often with as high probability as
possible, so
u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = lim sup IG (xn ),
n��

where IG (·) is the indicator function of the goal set G. Even if S has as few as three
states, there may be strategies which hit the goal inﬁnitely often with high prob
ability, but where each stationary strategy is worthless for this objective (Example
4.1 above). On the other hand, in all ﬁnite-state goal problems, there always exist
Markov strategies which nearly maximize the probability of hitting the goal inﬁnitely
often [Hi, Theorem 8.1], but the structure of such good Markov strategies in general
is much more complicated than just using a better gamble at each time period.
Example 4.2. S = {0, 1, g}, Γ(0) = {�(0)}, Γ(g) = {�(1)}, Γ(1) = {3−n �(0) +
2−n �(g) + (1 − 3−n − 2−n )�(1) : n � IN} ≥ {�(1)}. Note that state 0 is absorbing,
state g is reﬂecting, and each of the sets of gambles Γ(x) are closed. It can be checked
using the conditional version of Borel-Cantelli (Lévy 0-1 Law) that there exist Markov
strategies which are arbitrarily good (and which necessarily use successive gambles
for long time periods, roughly the order of 2n times), that no Markov strategy using
each gamble at most a ﬁxed number of times N is good, and that limits of good
strategies are not good, since every good strategy necessarily uses gambles closer and
closer to �(1), itself a worthless gamble.
Staying in the Goal. Analogous to the lim sup objective of hitting a goal inﬁnitely
often, the payoﬀ function
u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = lim inf IG (xn )
n��
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reﬂects the objective of maximizing the probability that the process eventually stays
in the goal set G forever. For countable S with this lim inf payoﬀ (and in fact for a
much larger class of payoﬀs), there always exist arbitrarily good Markov strategies
[HP, Theorem 4.1]. That neither good stationary strategies nor optimal Markov
strategies exist in general can be seen in Example 4.1 above.
Maximizing the Average Time at a Goal. An objective function which is between
that of reaching a goal set once and eventually staying in the goal set forever is the
objective of maximizing the average time spent in the goal, that is
u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = lim sup n
n��

−1

n
�

IG (xj )

j=1

(for ﬁnite S, lim sup and lim inf are equivalent [DH2, Corollary to Theorem 2]).
If S is ﬁnite and Γ(x) is a closed set (total-variation norm) of transition proba
bilities for each x, then there always exist nearly-optimal stationary strategies for the
objective of maximizing the average time in the goal [DH2, Theorem 1], in contrast
to the objective of hitting a goal inﬁnitely often, as seen in Example 4.2 above. If
Γ is arbitrary, there always exist nearly-optimal Markov strategies for this objective
[DH2, Theorem 2]. As with previous objectives, the limit of nearly-optimal strategies
may be worthless, as can be seen modifying Example 4.2 by letting Γ(g) = �(g); all
good strategies starting at 1 use gambles close to �(1), which is itself worthless for
the average-time objective as well.
Other Goal Payoﬀs. Other common payoﬀs in goal problems include those of
��
n
discounted rewards (u(x1 , x2 , . . .) =
n=1 � IG (xn ) for 0 < � < 1 ﬁxed), ﬁnite
�T
horizon rewards (e.g., u(x1 , x2 , . . .) = n=1 IG (xn ) for ﬁxed T ), supremum rewards,
product rewards, etc.; the interested reader is referred to [HP].
The proofs and applications of the above-mentioned results span a wide spec
trum of standard probability theory including Markov chains, martingales, 0-1 laws,
strong laws, randomizations, stochastic matrices, and dynamic programming, as well
as intricate ad hoc arguments and a broad and deep general theory of inequalities
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for stochastic processes in [DSa]; the references below are starting points to this
interesting and powerful subject.
5. Open Problems
The fundamental gambling-theory text by Dubins and Savage [DSa] contains a wellindexed list of open problems in this ﬁeld; the following are several additional ones.
Q1. (cf. [Hi]) Do good Markov strategies exist in all countable-state goal problems
with objective of hitting the goal inﬁnitely often?
Q2. (cf. [HvW]) Do monotonically-improving limit-optimal strategies exist in all
ﬁnite-state goal problems with average reward payoﬀ?
Q3. (cf. [St]) For what general class of goal problems do good measurable strategies
always exist?
Q4. (cf. [Ho]) What are eﬃcient algorithms for computation of optimal or good strate
gies in various classes of goal problems?
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